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The purpose of this article is to present and discuss the data for Portugal of the IntUne
survey on elite attitudes towards European integration. Despite some differences between
the Portuguese and the European results of the survey, we find that the concept of
‘compound citizenship’ (M. Cotta, ‘A “compound” model of citizenship? European
citizenship in the eyes of national elites’, Lisbon IntUne General Assembly, 27–30
November 2008) may be applied to the perceptions of Portuguese elites regarding the
European Union, and the postulated combination of an indirect European citizenship
with a direct one is also verifiable in Portugal. We hypothesise that this European
‘compound citizenship’ is not conflictive with national citizenship, possessing instead
elements for strengthening the linkage between them.
Keywords: Portuguese Elites; EU; Citizenship; European Identity; Portugal; IntUne Survey
This article describes and analyses the data for Portugal collected by the IntUne survey on
elite attitudes towards the European Union (EU). Following a brief historical overview of
Portugal’s path to European integration, it focuses on three major dimensions of
European citizenship—identity, representation, and scope of governance—and explores
the views that Portuguese political and economic elites have about them. Theoretically,
its approach is based on the ‘compound’ model of citizenship (Cotta 2008) which views
European citizenship as the result of a conflation of direct and indirect elements, and it
aims at shedding some light on the links between citizenship and polity at the national
and European levels. With regard to political elites, our analysis explores how ideological
orientations influence attitudes towards different aspects of European citizenship.
Historical Overview
When Portugal became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC), in
1986, expectations were high and largely optimistic. The governing elites successfully
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sought to legitimate the new democratic order using Europe and EEC membership. In
doing so, they adopted a very positive view of European integration that impacted
favorably on public opinion.
A founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Portugal
did not experience the same level of international isolation as its Spanish neighbour
following the Second World War (Pinto & Teixeira 2003). Receipt of the Marshall Plan,
membership of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and—following the
application of the United Kingdom—a trade agreement with the EEC in 1972 are
examples of the pragmatic approach the authoritarian regime took towards European
integration, in spite of the isolationist resistance to decolonisation in the 1960s (Alı´pio
2006; Leita˜o 2007). Nevertheless, in the context of the polarised transition to
democracy in 1974–76, when the crucial political divisions corresponded to a conflict
‘between democrats and revolutionaries [rather] than between democrats and
“involutionaries”’ (A´lvarez-Miranda 1996, p. 202), the European option was an
important factor in the break from a dictatorial and colonialist past, and also assumed
an anti-communist and anti-revolutionary orientation (Pinto & Teixeira 2003).
As in other South European transitions to democracy—particularly in Spain—‘the
idea that accession to the European Community would help guarantee liberal
democracy was more overtly voiced’ (A´lvarez-Miranda 1996) and was central to the
strategy of the political elites during this period. The swift Europeanisation of the
newly founded parties was also stimulated by their merging in the transnational
networks of the European political families. The theme of EEC membership soon
emerged in the programmes of the right and centre-right parties, the Social
Democratic Centre (CDS, Centro Democra´tico Social) proclaiming itself fully pro-
European, and the Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social Democrata) adopting
a more cautious approach (Barroso 1983). The CDS, which was affiliated to the
European Christian Democratic family, adopted a strongly pro-European strategy
right up to accession. The PSD, which was formed by the reformers and ‘liberals’ of the
dictatorship’s final years, first inserted itself into the European ‘liberal’ family,
although it defected to the European People’s Party in 1996. In 1976, the main slogan
of the electoral campaign of the Socialist Party (PS, Partido Socialista Portugueˆs) was
‘Europe with us’, and the proposal of EEC accession was incorporated in the party’s
programme.
The arguments in favour of the EEC were actively promoted as the means to
implement the necessary political and constitutional reforms for democratic
consolidation. Only the Communist Party (PCP, Partido Comunista Portugueˆs)
remained consistently opposed to EEC membership, and rejected the prospect of
accession. This opposition was an important element in its political campaigns
between 1977 and 1986. After 1986, the PCP stopped calling for Portugal to withdraw
from the EEC, and adopted a more moderate position. Following the Maastricht
Treaty, and with the challenge of a new competitor, the emergent Left Bloc (BE, Bloco
de Esquerda), the Communists again reinforced their critical stance, focusing on the
neo-liberal orientation taken by the EU. In the early 1990s, the CDS renamed
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themselves the Popular Party (PP). Under a new leadership, they also became more
Eurosceptic. Nevertheless, since the PS and the PSD have been strongly pro-European
and, as there is a trend of vote concentration in these two major parties, which have
polled together around 70 per cent, there is not a significant division on EU issues.
Civil society and the interest groups representing those who would be most affected
by EU membership had practically no role to play during any stage of the accession
negotiations. European integration was a decision made by the political elite alone,
rather than ‘a response to popular demand’ (Bermeo 1988, p. 14). The governing elites
dominated the negotiating process, with only limited involvement of business
associations or agricultural organised interests. Both the Confederation of Portuguese
Industry (CIP, Confederac¸a˜o da Industria Portuguesa) and the Portuguese Industrial
Association (AIP, Associac¸a˜o Industrial Portuguesa) supported accession, although to
different extents. The CIP wavered between domestic liberalisation and protectionism
towards the EEC, at the beginning demanding more pre-entry economic aid, and later
on showing opposition to the final agreements. The AIP adopted a more pragmatic ‘join
and see’ position. Nevertheless, despite the CIP’s occasional attacks, the hypothesis that
the attitudes of these two organisations reflected an attempt to make the government
adopt an aggressive negotiating stance, rather than any principled opposition appears
plausible, especially since these attitudes did not enjoy much support among their
affiliates. Several interviews with leading figures of the employers’ organisations reveal
that their attitudes towards accession were driven by political considerations, the EEC
being presented as the ‘guarantor for greater political security that will encourage
investment in and modernisation of the productive structures in the country’ (Lucena
& Gaspar 1991, p. 899).
Portugal’s route to EEC membership was therefore promoted by the political elite,
with a great degree of political consensus, and without any attempt to assess public
opinion through referenda. It was not until after accession had been secured that
popular opinion began to call for more public participation in the reforms that were
taking place within the EU. The perception of EEC membership as a positive goal was
initially restricted to the political elite. In 1978, shortly after the formal membership
application had been submitted, most Portuguese had no opinion on Europe, and over
60 per cent of the population stated that they did not know whether EEC membership
was essential for the future of Portugal’s economy (Bacalhau 1994). It was not until the
early 1980s that the Portuguese became better informed and thus able to express a
clearer opinion on the subject. The Eurobarometer survey has regularly recorded
Portuguese public opinion since 1980, and its reports have revealed a clear upward
trend in support of EEC membership, a large increase occurring in 1986, the year
Portugal finally joined. The proportion of the population believing EEC membership
to be ’a good thing’ rose from 24.4 per cent in 1980–82 to 64.5 per cent in 1986–90
and finally to above 70 per cent during the early 1990s (Bacalhau 1994, p. 269). In
1993, 65 per cent believed that Portuguese economic development had been boosted
greatly as a result of EEC membership. As appears to be the case in other South
European countries, there seems to be a strong suggestion that the urban middle
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classes generally tend towards pro-Europeanism and have only a weak sense of
‘national pride’, while the less educated and the rural lower classes generally have weak
pro-European sentiments and a strong sense of ‘national pride’ (Cruz 1993, p. 157)
The first ten years of Portugal’s membership in the EEC/EU was a ‘golden era’, with a
large degree of pro-European consensus within the party system. There was a wave of
economic growth and rising incomes, as well as real social change (Barreto 2003).
Internationally, Portugal used its stronger position as a member of the EU to resolve the
tensions prevailing with its former colonies in Africa. The optimism of the 1990s was
also marked by Portugal’s meeting the convergence criteria for adoption of the euro,
which occurred in 1999–2000. This contrasted with the situation at the beginning of
the following decade. With the EU’s movement towards enlargement and institutional
reform, as well as the eventual reduction of EU financial support, Portuguese public
opinion became less optimistic (Pinto & Lobo 2004).
On the whole, Portuguese attitudes towards the EU have been overwhelmingly
positive. However, it is important to note that the Portuguese consensus is based on a
narrow, instrumental view of the benefits of membership for Portugal rather than on
wider perceptions of the EU as ‘a good thing’. In terms of attitudes towards the EU as a
political system, the evidence is somewhat paradoxical: whereas the Portuguese
show little participation in the European Parliament (EP) elections and are dissatisfied
with the way democracy works in the EU, they have increasingly defended the
Europeanisation of key public policies such as foreign affairs and currency matters
(Pinto & Lobo 2004, p. 181). This concurs with the view that Portuguese attitudes are
positive, but are formed on an instrumental basis.
Elite Attitudes towards the EU: The 2007 IntUne Survey
Elite surveys are rare in Portugal, and the 2007 IntUne survey is the most
comprehensive one on European issues that has been conducted thus far. The survey
was carried out between February and March for the political elite respondents and
between March and May for the economic elite respondents. Following the sampling
criteria and procedures set up by the IntUne project, the group of interviewees
included 80 MPs and 40 businesspeople and top officeholders of major interest
organisations.1
In this article, we compare the general attitudes of the two types of elites, applying the
left–right division to further differentiate among the group of politicians. Ideologically,
we categorised the MPs as follows: the left includes all respondents who are members of
the PCP/PEV (the alliance between the Communist Party and the Green Party2) and of
the BE. The centre-left is composed of all respondents who belong to the PS, the single
party in government with an absolute majority when the IntUne survey took place. The
centre-right aggregates the respondents of the PSD, historically the alternative party of
government. The right is represented by all respondents who are members of the
CDS/PP. With the significant exception of the BE, which emerged in the late 1990s, the
other four major parties have been the central actors in the parliamentary arena since
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the elections of 1975, a defining moment in the democratic transition. A trend of vote
concentration in the two large centre parties, the PS and the PSD, developed from 1987
onwards,3 and since then the two of them together have controlled more than four-
fifths of the parliamentary seats (Almeida & Freire 2005, pp. 457–462).
From a theoretical view, we apply the ‘compound’ model of citizenship (Cotta 2008)
to the analysis of the elusive concept that is European citizenship. The term
‘compound citizenship’ refers to the idea that European citizenship is actually an
amalgamation of two separate but intertwined dimensions: an indirect citizenship that
is derived from the national citizenship of a member state of the EU, and a direct one
that is originated and established by the existence of a system of European institutions.
European citizenship is further characterised by an horizontal dimension that defines
the membership linkage with the European polity, and by a vertical dimension that
concerns the relationship between the European citizens and the authorities of the EU
(Cotta & Isernia 2009).
Following the guidelines of the IntUne project, we will present and discuss here
descriptive data on three major dimensions of Europeanness—identity, representation,
and scope of governance. The topics covered range from the degree of attachment to
different territorial communities and the basic elements considered to be constitutive of
the European and the national identity, to the levels of trust in both European and
Portuguese institutions and the evaluation of EU common policy areas and levels of
policymaking.
Allegiance to Different Territorial Entities
In order to explore the horizontal dimension of European citizenship, we have
analysed the feelings of attachment of elites to different territorial levels, their
evaluation of the benefits produced by membership in the EU, and their conceptions
of what defines the national as well as the supranational identity.
Regarding the different levels of territorial attachment of the respondents (see
Table 1), we find that all Portuguese elite groups consider themselves strongly
attached to Portugal as a country, first and foremost, and also strongly attached to
their town and village. This perception prevails in all ideological groups. When we
look at the regional attachment, we find that the consensus is broken. The
respondents of the political elite are much more attached to their regions (61 per cent
are ‘very attached’) than those of the economic elite (only 32 per cent are ‘very
attached’). Analysing the political groups, the centre-right and the left show,
respectively, the highest (65 per cent) and the lowest (38 per cent) proportion of
respondents attached to the regions. Finally, a very large majority of the political and
economic Portuguese elite feel attached to the EU. However, if one considers only the
strongest expression of attachment, the difference between the European and the
national levels is significant. This result seems to confirm the idea that a feeling of
supranational belonging can coexist with the national one, and also that it is felt as
being indirect and therefore weaker in intensity.
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It can also be noted that the supranational allegiance is stronger among the
MPs (45 per cent) than the businessmen (38 per cent). From an ideological
standpoint, only the left (BE and PCP/PEV) appears to have a relevant number of
respondents (24 per cent) who do not consider themselves attached to the EU, which
could explain some of the less positive views about the EU that this group will show
along this study.
In most mass opinion surveys, when asked about the benefits of the European
integration process, the majority of the Portuguese believe that it is a good thing and
that Portugal has benefited from it. Thus it should not be a surprise that Portuguese
elites overwhelmingly believe that Portugal has benefited from the European
integration process. The only exception is the left: two-thirds of respondents from the
BE and the PCP/PEV claim that Portugal has not benefited from being a member state
of the EU.
Identity
While examining how elites define territorial identities at the national level, Table 2
shows that the attribute of being Christian is considered ‘not important’ by a large
majority of both the political elite (74 per cent) and the economic elite (66 per cent).
When we turn to a detailed analysis of the political elite, based on party affiliations and
ideological self-positioning, we find a significant distinction: most respondents on the
left consider the religious attribute irrelevant, while half of the respondents on the
right believe it is ‘somewhat/very important’.
The sharing of Portuguese cultural values is consensually considered ‘some-
what/very important’ by both the political (94 per cent) and the economic (95 per
cent) elites. Surprisingly, the less favourable attitude in this overwhelming consensus
comes from those on the far right of the political spectrum: only 75 per cent
considered it ‘somewhat/very important’. All the other groups show percentages well
beyond the 90 per cent level.
Being born in the national territory is considered a ‘very/somewhat important’
attribute by 66 per cent of the MPs and 70 per cent of the businesspeople. Both the left
and the right seem to differentiate themselves from the consensus on this matter. Only
38 per cent of those who are members of the BE or of the PCP/PEV, as well as 25 per
cent of their ideological counterparts on the right, feel that being born in Portugal is
considered an important feature of national identity. The nationality of one’s parents
is also considered important by an overwhelming majority of the political (78 per
cent) and the economic (76 per cent) elites. In terms of political groups, only the left
diverges from this opinion.
The respect for national laws and traditions is seen as ‘somewhat/very important’
across the elites (98 per cent of the politicians and an equal percentage of
businesspeople). The slightly lower importance (95 per cent) accorded to this element
by those who place themselves at the centre-left of the ideological spectrum (in
comparison with those on the left, centre-right and right) should be noted.
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We now turn to the elements of identity that are associated with the supranational
level of the European integration process (Table 2), in an attempt to determine the
meaning that the Portuguese elites attribute to the blurry concept of European
identity.
Starting with the religious dimension, we find great similarities with the attributes
of national identity. Once again, the fact that someone is Christian has little relevance
for both the political (16 per cent) and economic (30 per cent) elites. As regards MPs,
this appears to be one of the clearest issues in terms of ideological positioning. The left
unanimously agrees that religion is not a relevant attribute in terms of European
identity, while 50 per cent of respondents on the right express the opposite opinion.
A more fundamental consensus about European identity appears when we focus on
cultural values. The same proportions (87–88 per cent) of both elite groups claim that
sharing European cultural values is an important attribute of European identity.
The fact that someone was born in a European country is seen generally by the
political and economic elites as an important attribute of his/her European identity.
Once again, this is one of the few items where we find a clear ideological division
among the politicians. Birthplace is considered a relevant characteristic by only a
minority on the left (38 per cent) while the remaining respondents hold the opposite
position.
Having European parents is another attribute of European identity that is
considered important to the majority of the political (54 per cent) and the economic
(70 per cent) elites. However, we must emphasise the high degree to which the
economic elite tends to support this claim vis-a`-vis their political counterpart. In
terms of political groups, the respondents of the BE and the PCP/PEV clearly reject
this attribute as an important one. The centre-left tends to follow the general opinion
in this matter. Finally, respect for European institutions and laws is valued as an
important attribute of European identity by all elite groups.
Ever since Linton (1936), the terms ‘ascribed’ and ‘achieved’ have contrasted
inherited attributes—i.e. those not depending on the subject’s will—with those that
depend upon the subject’s actions. Parsons (1951) has demonstrated the importance
of these two concepts as characterisations of social roles, and they have remained
important sociological analytical tools. It has been pointed out that ascribed and
achieved components exist in both national and European identities (Sanders 2008).
Religion, birthplace and parenting are associated with the ascribed dimension of
identity, whereas culture, respect of law, feelings and language are achieved
components.
Using factor analysis for the Portuguese elite sample, we find an ascribed
component of European identity, with birthplace and parents’ origin as a part of the
same factor (Table 3). Likewise, there appears to be an achieved dimension, ‘the
respect for law and institutions’ and the ‘feeling of being European’ being associated in
the same factor. Moreover, we find a high and positive interaction with the religious
and cultural attributes. This seems to indicate that the cultural dimension of European
identity in Portugal is greatly associated with Christianity. This concurs with the idea
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of Europe as a ‘torn country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer
the question of whether European unity . . . should be defined by the common
heritage of Christianity and Western civilisation or by its modern secular values’
(Casanova 2006, p. 74).
With regard to the components of national identity, birthplace and parents’ origin
are part of the ascribed component see Table 4. In the Portuguese elites, the feeling of
being Portuguese, mastering the Portuguese language and sharing Portuguese cultural
traditions—elements that constitute the achieved component on the European scale—
are also strongly and positively loaded in the same factor. This indicates that, likewise,
there exists an achieved component of national identity.
Table 3 Components of European identity: factor analysis
Component
Rotated component matrix Ascribed Achieved Cultural/religious
To be born in Europe 0.857 20.139 0.125
To have European parents 0.871 0.153 0.046
To respect EU laws and institutions 0.006 0.847 20.119
To feel European 0.007 0.813 0.201
To be a Christian 0.128 20.032 0.707
To share European cultural traditions 0.017 0.094 0.774
Rotation sums of squared loadings 25.169 23.846 19.523
Note: Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser
normalisation. Rotation converged in four iterations; variables that loaded on more than one factor
were removed.
Source: IntUne 2007 Elite Survey in Portugal.
Table 4 Components of national identity: factor analysis
Component
Rotated component matrix Achieved Ascribed Citizenship
To share cultural traditions 0.628 0.179 0.002
To feel Portuguese 0.716 20.121 0.227
To master the Portuguese language 0.846 20.095 20.089
To be born in Portugal 20.015 0.820 0.070
To have Portuguese parents 20.041 0.806 20.023
To be a Christian 0.195 0.378 20.458
To be a Portuguese citizen 0.050 0.088 0.872
To respect Portuguese laws and institutions 20.059 20.011 20.324
Rotation sums of squared loadings 20.838 19.113 14.260
Note: Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser
normalisation. Rotation converged in four iterations.
Source: IntUne 2007 Elite Survey in Portugal.
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Representation
Having explored the horizontal dimension of citizenship, we may now switch our
attention to the vertical one. With regard to the dimension of representation, we will
first analyse how trust in European institutions compares with trust in the national
ones, then how elites evaluate the representation of national interests in the European
sphere, and finally we will examine their views about the main institutions of the EU.
Trust in a country’s political institutions (especially government and parliament) is
one of the questions most frequently addressed to European audiences, usually
attempting to compare it with the trust they have in European institutions. Generally
speaking, in Portugal, the national government and parliament have low levels of
public trust; on the contrary, the levels of trust in European institutions are
considerably higher (European Commission 2008a, p. 13). When we look at the results
of the IntUne elite survey, a comparison between trust in the Portuguese and the
European institutions is only possible for the economic elite (Table 5). Surprisingly,
and in contrast to the mass surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer), the Portuguese economic
elite tends to have more trust in the Portuguese political institutions than in the
European ones. The institution they trust the most is the Portuguese national
government, while the local and regional governments are the institutions they trust
the least.
When we compare trust in European institutions among MPs and businesspeople,
the former tend to have more trust in the EP and the European Council of Ministers
than do their economic counterparts. The reverse is true when the topic becomes the
European Commission, which is more trusted by businesspeople than by Portuguese
MPs. This could be a by-product of the Commission being seen as a less political
institution than the others.
When we turn to the ideological composition of the political elite, we find that the
left shows far less confidence in all the European institutions than the other groups.
The question of whether Portuguese interests are taken enough into account in the EU
is also routinely asked in mass surveys (European Commission 2008a, p. 36), and often
the results show a fairly even split in opinion. As for the perspective of the elites, the
majority of the businesspeople (60 per cent) believe that Portuguese interests are not
influential in European decision-making, while a thin majority (53 per cent) of the
MPs have the opposite opinion.
If we consider the party affiliation and ideological profile of the respondents, we
find that the members of the BE and PCP/PEV unanimously hold the opinion that
Portuguese interests have a limited influence in Brussels, and the same opinion is
found amongst the most right-wing respondents. An opposite view is shared by the
majority of the respondents of PS (63 per cent) and PSD (62 per cent), the two
mainstream parties that have been the pillars of government in Portuguese democracy.
Another topic that was addressed by the IntUne survey on the Portuguese elites
concerns their views about the powers of the three primary actors of the EU: the EP,
the member states and the Commission. As we can see, the Portuguese political elite
South European Society and Politics 67
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tends to fundamentally support the role of the EP and of the member states in the
European political process (Table 6). The Commission is seen less positively by the
MPs, only 43 per cent believing it should become the true government of the EU. This
contrasts with the economic elite: 58 per cent of respondents are in favour of a much
stronger role for the Commission in the European process, although they likewise
want the member states to remain the central actors (76 per cent) and advocate the
strengthening of the EP’s powers (64 per cent).
Looking at the ideological composition of the Portuguese political elite, we find that
the support for the MEMBER STATES as central actors in Europe is larger within
the left and right of the political spectrum than it is in the centre. By contrast, there
appears to be much less support in the ideological extremes for the role of the
Commission. Regarding the EP, only the right has a more negative view of a possible
strengthening of its powers.
Scope of Governance
Analysing the topic of the future institutional development of the EU in terms of
policy areas, and more specifically the question of support for a unified tax system for
the EU, the majority of both politicians and businesspeople agree that this should be
implemented in the next ten years (Table 7). When we deconstruct the elements of the
political elite, we find the strongest support among the respondents of the PS, while
the more right-wing elements are against it.
Concerning a common social security system in Europe, the political and the
economic elites are overwhelmingly supportive of this scheme, but those who are
‘strongly’ in favour are in a larger proportion among businesspeople (32 per cent) than
MPs (22 per cent). Ideological and party lines are irrelevant in this matter, with the
exception of the right. These results are surprising. If there is a policy area that
typically separates the left from the right, it is social security, and Portugal is no
Table 6 Powers of EU institutions (per cent of respondents)
Political elite
Political
elite
Economic
elite
Left Centre-
left
Centre-
right
Right
The member states ought
to remain the central actors
of the EU
Agree strongly 46 38 62 43 38 100
Agree somewhat 30 38 25 31 35 0
The European Commission
ought to become the true
government of the EU
Agree strongly 9 10 0 14 4 0
Agree somewhat 34 48 0 33 46 25
The powers of the European
Parliament ought to be
strengthened
Agree strongly 41 28 62 44 35 0
Agree somewhat 35 36 12 37 38 50
Source: IntUne 2007 Elite Survey in Portugal.
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exception. Although the IntUne survey does not possess elements that enable us to
capture the motivations of such disparate ideological groups on this topic, we can
hypothesise that both the left and the right tend to support a common European
security system for different reasons. To the left wing of the Portuguese parliament, the
transference of an egalitarian welfare system to the European arena may be seen as the
only way to prevent the erosion of the domestic welfare state. On the contrary, the MPs
to the right may believe that the perceived neo-liberal tendencies of the European
integration process may be another nail in the coffin of the public welfare state.
The responses to the question about a single foreign policy for Europe show a
contrast between the politicians and the businesspeople. While the latter are much
more enthusiastic in their support (60 per cent ‘strongly in favour’), the MPs are much
more divided in their positive opinion (44 per cent are ‘strongly in favour’, while 45
per cent are ‘somewhat in favour’). It should be noted that the left tends to be strongly
opposed to a single European foreign policy, and that on this topic the centre-right is
much less enthusiastic than the centre-left (although still somewhat supportive).
The political and economic elites are both in favour of the idea of more help for
regions, although MPs are much more supportive (75 per cent are ‘strongly in favour’)
than businesspeople (58 per cent are ‘strongly in favour’). Among politicians,
although all groups are unanimously supportive, the right appears to be less warm in
its support.
Finally, we will try to determine the preferred level of governance (regional, national
or European) for a series of policy issues according to the perceptions of the Portuguese
elites (Tables 8–9). For all these, the regional level is overwhelmingly considered
inappropriate, an attitude that probably stems from the non-existence of regional
governments in the Portuguese territory (with the exception of the islands of Madeira
and the Azores). In fact, Portugal ‘has a long tradition of political and administrative
centralisation’ (Almeida & Pinto 2003, p. 17), and is today characterised as a ‘highly
Table 8 Preferred levels of governance, by policy sector (per cent of respondents)
National/
regional level
European
level
Mixed levels
including European
Fighting unemployment Political elite 42 38 20
Economic elite 58 35 8
Immigration policy Political elite 12 68 20
Economic elite 15 75 10
Environment policy Political elite 6 71 22
Economic elite 18 72 10
Fight against crime Political elite 31 39 30
Economic elite 35 45 20
Health care policy Political elite 76 10 14
Economic elite 70 25 5
Taxation Political elite 41 39 20
Economic elite 48 45 8
Source: IntUne 2007 Elite Survey in Portugal.
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unitarian democracy’ (Diamandouros & Gunther 2001, p. 20). Thus, we will aggregate
the regional level with the national one. A second aggregate category includes all answers
in which a combination of levels, inclusive of the European level, was suggested by
respondents as the most appropriate way to deal with a given policy issue.
Starting with the political elite as a whole, there seems to be a divided opinion
over which is the best level of government to handle unemployment: 42 per cent of
respondents consider the national/regional level the best to deal with this issue, and
38 per cent prefer the European level. The economic elite is less divided, a majority
(58 per cent) preferring the national/regional level. When we look at specific groups, it
is once again between the more radicals (left and right) and the moderates (centre-
left and centre-right) that the greatest differences emerge: 62 per cent of the left
respondents and 75 per cent of the right consider the national level as the most
adequate to fight unemployment, while only 33 per cent of the centre-left and 46 per
cent of the centre-right feel that unemployment must be resolved at the domestic level.
Immigration policy is largely seen as a European issue. The discordant position
is taken by the left, which is the only political group to advocate by a majority
Table 9 Preferred levels of governance, by policy sector and ideological groups (per cent of
respondents)
National/
regional level
European
level
Mixed levels
including European
Fighting unemployment Left 62 25 12
Centre-left 33 38 29
Centre-right 46 42 12
Right 75 25 0
Immigration policy Left 62 25 12
Centre-left 5 71 24
Centre-right 12 73 15
Right 0 75 25
Environment policy Left 12 50 38
Centre-left 5 64 31
Centre-right 8 85 8
Right 0 100 0
Fighting crime Left 62 12 25
Centre-left 21 45 33
Centre-right 35 42 23
Right 50 0 50
Health care policy Left 75 12 12
Centre-left 79 10 12
Centre-right 77 12 12
Right 50 0 50
Taxation Left 50 38 12
Centre-left 31 45 24
Centre-right 50 31 19
Right 75 25 0
Source: IntUne 2007 Elite Survey in Portugal.
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(62 per cent) that immigration policy should be predominantly dealt with at the
national level.
The fight against crime is an issue that divides MPs and businesspeople, although
the majority of both groups consider the European level of governance the best to
handle this issue. Among politicians, there is an extensive gap between the radicals on
one hand and the moderates on the other. To 62 per cent of the left, the national level is
the best one; by contrast, 45 per cent of respondents in the centre-left and 42 per cent
in the centre-right believe that the European level is the most appropriate.
Environment policy is a consensual issue, since both the political and the economic
elites overwhelmingly agree that the European level is the most adequate. A reversed
consensus occurs with health care: all groups defend the national level as the most
adequate, which seems to be somewhat incongruent with the broad support for a
European system of social security. Taxation is a more divisive issue, half of the
respondents of both the political and the economic elites preferring the national level
of governance, and the other half the European level.
It has been shown (Lengyel et al. 2008) that elite respondents perceive two different
groups of issues as related to two different levels of policymaking. Unemployment,
healthcare and taxation are deemed by European elites to be mainly domestic/national
issues. In turn, environment, immigration and crime are seen as transnational/su-
pranational issues. At the European level, these dimensions were confirmed by factor
analysis. However, if we consider exclusively the Portuguese elite sample, factor
analysis does not enable us to infer this dichotomy. This means that for the Portuguese
case each topic must be analysed individually.
Conclusion
European citizenship has been defined as a ‘compound citizenship’ (Cotta 2008),
comprising an indirect citizenship, as a consequence of the already existing national
citizenship, and a direct citizenship, which is the consequence of European institutions
and policies. And, as in the analysis of national citizenship, we can find two distinct
linkages between citizens and the polity: a horizontal dimension, that relates to
membership in the European polity, and a vertical dimension, that connects the
citizens with the political institutions (Cotta & Isernia 2009).
There are some elements that characterise the horizontal dimension of European
citizenship within the Portuguese political elite. As has been argued (Cotta 2008), it is
expected that an indirect model of citizenship will result in a weaker level of
attachment to the EU than to the national polity. The Portuguese respondents
confirm this expectation—45 per cent of the MPs are ‘very attached’ to the EU, while
92 per cent are strongly attached to their country (see Table 1). This may imply an
instrumental allegiance to Europe, since the Portuguese elites overwhelmingly believe
that the country has benefited from European integration.
The elements of national and European identity, as they are perceived by the
Portuguese elites, show, however, considerable divergence from the generic European
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perception. As argued by Sanders (2008), there exists a mix of ascribed and achieved
components in both the European and national identities. In the Portuguese case,
beyond the above-mentioned components, European identity is seen as possessing an
additional cultural/religious component: those who consider European culture an
element of European identity do so because of the religious connotation they attribute
to that very European culture.
Despite the secularisation of Europe being an ‘undeniable social fact’, the decline of
regular participation in traditional religious ceremonies seems to be counterbalanced
by a relatively high level of private religious beliefs (Casanova 2006, p. 65). This leads
some authors to claim that in Europe, at the individual level, secular and Christian
cultural identities are not easily separated, or even acknowledged as contradictory
concepts (Hervieu-Le´ger 2000; Casanova 2006). In Portugal, at the elite level, the
conception of Christianity is a driving element of European culture. This combines
with the secular element of Portuguese national identity, giving further evidence to the
paradox that ‘secular Europe’s boundaries are becoming more sharply defined in
religious terms’ (Beckford 1994, p. 167, as quoted in Byrnes 2006, p. 284).
As for the vertical dimension of European citizenship (the relationship between the
members of the polity and its political authorities), it has been argued that there are
elements of a direct linkage (via the EP) and of an indirect linkage (via the European
Council of Ministers), while the Commission is at the crossroads (Cotta 2008). Like
their European counterparts, the majority of Portuguese respondents defend the
strengthening of the powers of Parliament as well as the role of member states as
central actors in the process of Europeanisation. In most EU countries, support for the
Commission is, however, much weaker among MPs than among businesspeople. This
has been interpreted as a resistance of the national political elites to abdicating their
role in the guidance of the European process. Actually, the EP is much more connected
to the national polity (via elections that have a markedly national character) than the
Commission (Cotta 2008).
This weaker support for the Commission on the part of the MPs also corresponds to a
lower level of trust. They trust the Council of Ministers and the EP more than they trust
the Commission. Economic elites have the opposite view: they trust the Commission
more than the other EU institutions. Yet, both elite groups trust Portuguese political
institutions more than their European counterparts. This contradicts a dominant trend
in public opinion surveys (European Commission 2008a, p. 36). Traditionally, the
Portuguese trust the European institutions in general more than they do national
institutions. The fact that elite attitudes are so different from the rest of the population
on this topic is intriguing, and may be justified by the greater influence of both
economic and political elites in their national institutions. However, when asked if
national interests are taken into consideration in Brussels, the majority of the political
elite believes that they are, while the bulk of the businesspeople believe they are not.
Here, the opinion of the latter converges with that of ordinary Portuguese citizens
(European Commission 2008b, p. 28). These differences of opinion could indicate that
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businesspeople do not feel that they have much influence in Brussels, unlike the MPs,
who would tend to present their own actions in the best light possible.
Regarding the scope of governance, it has been argued that the results of the survey
in most member states show the existence of two types of topics correlated with
different preferred policymaking levels (Lengyel et al. 2008). Unemployment,
healthcare and taxation are deemed by European elites to be mainly domestic/national
issues. In turn, environment, immigration and crime are seen as transnational/
supranational issues. Although it is not negligible, this dichotomy does not appear to
be so relevant in the Portuguese case.
To conclude, despite some differences between the Portuguese and the European
results regarding the IntUne elite survey, we find that the concept of a ‘compound
citizenship’ (Cotta 2008) may be applied to perceptions of the Portuguese elites
regarding the EU. Although further study is necessary to refine some of its dimensions,
the combination of an indirect European citizenship with a direct one appears to exist in
Portugal. And, as has been argued for the EU countries as a whole, this European
‘compound citizenship’ is not in conflict with national citizenship. On the contrary, it
possesses elements for strengthening their linkage.
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Notes
[1] As regards the deputies, the group of frontbenchers interviewed comprises all six leaders of the
party parliamentary groups, most chairs (ten out of 12) of the standing committees and 25 former
government members. The businesspeople—top leaders of the largest enterprises and banks—
were selected from a list of the ‘Top 500’ corporations, ranked according to revenue, published by
the magazine Exame in 2006. Most of the interviews (106 out of 120) were face to face.
[2] A small organisation founded in 1982 and orbiting around the Communist Party.
[3] In the legislative election of 2005 the combined vote for the two major parties slightly declined
(from 78 to 73.8 per cent), a reversal that was clearly confirmed in 2009 (65.7 per cent). In 2009,
the sum of the parliamentary seats gained by PS and PSD also declined sharply, reaching its
lowest level (77.4 per cent) since 1987.
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